# SAMPLE

## Building Tomorrow's Entrepreneurs

The Founder's Operating Discipline for the Venture-Building Decade

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# INTRODUCTION

This is the eighth book in the Building Tomorrow's People series, and the third in its structural line: after the consultants and the chief executives, it takes up the entrepreneurs -- the founders who start the organizations everyone else works in, and whose journey, for all the ink spilled on it, is still mostly taught as folklore: the hero stories, the crash stories, the pattern-seeking over survivors, and the advice that dates itself with every product cycle. The book takes the series' standing approach instead: the entrepreneur's journey as an operating discipline -- a sequence of decisions, each with its own evidence, its own failure modes, and its own instruments, from the founding decision itself through the co-founder, the first customer, the capital, the scaling, the founder's own changing role, the hard times, and the exit.

The reader should know at the start what this book is and is not. It is not a book about startup tools, technologies, or any particular market's mechanics; the series' fifth volume already covered the builder's toolkit for the AI era, and the tools change faster than any of the decisions this book is about. It is not a book of inspiration, because inspiration is abundant and the founders this book is written for are already inspired. It is a book of discipline: the founding decision made deliberately rather than restlessly; the co-founder chosen like the leader they will become rather than the colleague they happen to be; the first customer treated as evidence rather than as validation theater; the capital raised on the venture's actual needs rather than the market's actual flattery; the scaling decision held until its conditions are real; the founder's role rebuilt at each stage before the stage forces the rebuilding; the hard times run by discipline rather than by adrenaline; and the exit decided by the founder's own arc rather than the market's timing. Every chapter follows the structure the series has used throughout: the anatomy of the discipline, its failure modes, its instruments, and the practice the founder can run -- closing with an argument and a checklist, because the series' readers are practitioners, and practitioners read to act.

The book's position, stated plainly, is that entrepreneurship's folklore problem is the same problem every profession's folklore problem is: the survivors teach their path as if the path caused the survival, and the listeners copy the path without the luck. The disciplines in this book make no promises about outcomes -- ventures fail for reasons no discipline can remove -- but they change what the founder controls: the quality of the decisions, the honesty of the evidence, the speed of the corrections, and the founder's own durability across the whole arc. That is what an operating discipline can do in a venture, and it is enough: the disciplined founder fails smaller, learns faster, and survives to build again -- and the ones who build something that lasts are, almost without exception, the ones running some version of the instruments in these chapters.

# CHAPTER 1: THE FOUNDING DECISION

## 1.1 The decision before everything

Every venture begins with a decision that receives almost no deliberate treatment: the founding decision itself -- the choice to start. The culture treats it as a spark (the founder "decides to take the leap") and the folklore treats it as a personality trait (founders are "born"), but the practiced view is different: the founding decision is the first real decision of the venture, it sets conditions everything later inherits, and it deserves the same deliberateness the founder will later demand of every other decision of consequence. The decision has three components the book treats in turn: the motive (why this founder, why this venture, why now), the position (what the founder is actually carrying into the founding -- capital, obligations, family, runway, energy), and the fit (whether the person making the decision is the person the venture's actual work will demand). The founding decision made restlessly -- the escape from a job, the itch to be one's own boss, the fear of missing a window -- is not a wrong motive, but it is an unexamined one, and unexamined motives surface later as the venture's unexamined strategy, because the organization always grows from the seed of its founding, and a restless seed grows a restless company.

The decision's structure is worth naming because most founders never see it. It is made under maximum uncertainty (the venture's future is unknowable at the moment of founding), with minimum information (no customers, no product, no evidence), by the person with the maximum emotional stake -- the exact inversion of every decision discipline the founder will later need to run. Which is the founding decision's real lesson: it is the one decision that cannot be made well by process, only by honesty -- the founder's honest audit of their own motive, position, and fit, made before the venture's momentum makes the audit impossible. This chapter builds that audit. The chapters that follow build everything else.

## 1.2 The motive audit

The motive audit is the founding decision's first instrument, and its premise is blunt: everyone who founds has motives, the motives are mixed, and the venture will eventually be run by whichever motive the founder never named. The audit is a written one, in the founder's own hand, with three columns. The first is the honest list: every reason this venture appeals, without editing -- the money, the freedom, the status, the craft, the mission, the escape, the example set for the founder's children; the audit's first discipline is that no motive is written down as a synonym for another (the "freedom" that is really escape from a manager, the "mission" that is really status, the "impact" that is really wealth), because the synonym survives the audit and the real motive does not, and the unnamed motive becomes the venture's unnamed strategy. The second column is the test: how would this motive look as a pattern of behavior, sustained for ten years? The freedom motive that looks like a pattern of avoiding hard conversations; the mission motive that looks like a decade of telling the mission story to rooms; the wealth motive that looks like a decade of small exits -- each pattern is legitimate, and each is a different venture, and the founder who has never seen their motive as a decade-long pattern has never seen their motive at all.

The third column is the conflict forecast: which motives will demand different things of the

same venture, and when. The motive that wants freedom and the motive that wants scale are in conflict from the first hire; the motive that wants wealth and the motive that wants legacy are in conflict at the exit; the motive that wants escape and the motive that wants to be admired are in conflict at every failure. The audit's yield is not a verdict -- no motive disqualifies a founder -- but a calibration: the founder who knows the venture's actual motive mix knows what the venture will feel like in year four, what decisions will feel expensive that other founders find easy, and what success will actually have to look like for the founder to recognize it. The founding failures that look mysterious from outside -- the founder who burned a working company to chase a status venture, the founder who sold a growing company too early for reasons they could not articulate -- are motive conflicts that were auditable at the founding, and usually are, in the founding documents of the founders who take the audit seriously and skip it anyway.

## 1.3 The position audit

The second instrument is the position audit: the honest statement of what the founder is carrying into the founding, because the venture's first years are run not on the business plan but on the founder's actual position -- the resources, obligations, and energy the venture will consume before it produces. The position has four balances. The financial balance: the runway the founder can actually sustain -- the savings, the family's tolerance, the cost structure the founder is willing to live inside -- counted in months of full-time work without income, and stated honestly against the venture's realistic time-to-first-revenue, because the venture that needs eighteen months of runway and the founder who has six is not a scrappy company; it is a predictable failure with an inspiring launch. The obligation balance: the dependents, the commitments, the identity the founder is interrupting -- the career capital that the founding pauses, the family that co-founds whether it consented or not, and the honest conversation that the obligations deserve before the founding rather than during the venture's first crisis.

The energy balance: the founder's actual physical and emotional durability, which the venture will spend at a rate the founder has never experienced; the founding era's celebrated all-nighters are the cheap part, and the expensive part is the third year of unbroken uncertainty, and the position audit's question is whether the founder's energy system -- recovery, support, health -- is built for the marathon the folklore confuses with a sprint. And the identity balance: the founder's relationship to their own current identity -- the title, the expertise, the standing -- which the founding interrupts, and which the founder who has never lived without an institutional identity will pay for in the venture's first year, in the currency of self-worth, at exchange rates that surprise everyone. The position audit's yield is the same as the motive audit's: not a verdict but a calibration. The founder who knows their actual position builds a venture that fits it -- the runway matched to the timeline, the obligations inside the plan rather than outside it -- and the founder who does not has founded a company that is running, from day one, against their own position, and the position always wins.

## 1.4 The fit question

The third instrument is the hardest of the three: the fit question -- is the person making the founding decision the person the venture's actual work will demand? The folklore version of

the question is the personality test (are you a founder type?), and the folklore's answer is the myth this book is written against, because there is no founder type: the venture-building decade has been run by introverts and salesmen, planners and improvisers, the obsessive and the serene. The practiced version of the question is narrower and more honest: the fit between the founder and this venture -- its market, its work, its decade. The fit question has three parts. The first is the market fit: does the founder have the standing to see this market's problems -- the domain knowledge, the network, the pattern of noticing that this particular market rewards? The second is the work fit: does the founder love the work of the venture, not the idea of it -- the actual daily texture of the venture's craft, which is discovery followed by persuasion followed by operations, and the founder who loves the founding but not the work has founded a company they will spend a decade trying to escape.

The third part is the season fit: the honest question of timing -- not the market's timing (which Chapter 2 treats) but the founder's: is this the founder's season for a decade of venture-building, and does the founder know what season they are in? The young founder's season has energy and runway and no scar tissue; the mid-career founder's has pattern and network and obligations; the late founder's has judgment and capital and a shorter runway -- every season can found, and every season founds differently, and the founding decision that copies another season's founding (the mid-career founder founding like a twenty-five-year-old, the young founder borrowing the mid-career founder's deliberateness) has imported a mismatch the venture will pay for. The fit question's answer is written, like the other two audits, before the founding: a page, honest, revisited at the venture's first hard gate -- because the fit changes, the venture changes the founder, and the founder who has written the fit answer once can see the change coming, while the one who never wrote it discovers the change only as the feeling that the venture has stopped fitting, which is the most expensive way to learn what the page would have shown.

## 1.5 The leap and the bridge

The audits assembled, the founding decision still has a shape, and the shape deserves its own treatment because the folklore flattens it: the leap. The cultural image -- quit everything, burn the boats, let the hunger focus you -- is one shape, and it is real, and it works, and it is also the shape with the shortest runway and the least honest decision-making under pressure, because the founder who leapt is the founder who cannot afford the truth about the venture's early evidence. The other shape is the bridge: the founding started before it was announced -- the venture's first work done nights and weekends, the first customers found before the resignation letter, the runway preserved while the evidence accumulates -- and the bridge, for all its reputation as the timid version, is the founding shape that lets the founding decision be re-made honestly, because the bridging founder has not yet bet the position, and the venture's early evidence can still end the founding cheaply. The bridge has its own failure -- the bridge that never ends, the eternal side project, the founder who kept the job and kept the option and never made the decision -- and its discipline is the gate: the bridge is built with a stated commitment in advance (a date, a revenue, a customer count, a decision deadline) at which the founding decision is made fully or released honestly.

The leap and the bridge share the same final instrument, and the chapter closes on it: the founding decision written down -- the one-page statement of what was decided, why, with what evidence, under what conditions the founder would un-decide, and when the decision

will be reviewed. The page is the venture's first artifact and the founder's first discipline, and it sets the pattern the whole book builds: decisions made deliberately, stated in writing, held honestly, reviewed on evidence. The founder who writes the founding page has begun the operating discipline that runs from this chapter through the exit of Chapter 10 -- and the founder who does not has begun the folklore version, in which the founding is a feeling, the feeling becomes the strategy, and the venture's story is written afterward by whoever survives to write it.

### The window question

The founding audits have a companion question the folklore raises constantly and answers badly: the window -- is this the right time to found, is the market's moment open, will the opportunity be gone if the founder waits? The question deserves deliberate treatment because it is both real and corrosive: real, because markets do have windows (the buyer's readiness, the technology's cost curve, the regulation's shape -- conditions that open and close, and the venture founded against a closed window is not merely unlucky; it is late), and corrosive, because the window narrative is the founding record's most reliable source of bad decisions -- the founder who leapt at a window that was mostly a headline, and the founder who waited a decade for a window that never validated anything, and both of them mistaking the market's noise for the market's timing.

The window question's discipline is the evidence question again, asked of the timing itself: what observable condition makes this window real -- the cost curve crossing a threshold, the buyers' budget line appearing, the regulation changing the economics, the infrastructure arriving that the venture's model needs? A window stated in observables can be checked monthly and founded against honestly; a window stated in vibes (everyone is talking about it; the money is flowing) is the derived idea of Chapter 2 wearing a clock -- the trend, plus urgency. The honest answer, most of the time, is quieter than the folklore's version: the windows that produce durable ventures are usually wide and long -- the conditions that make the venture's market real tend to persist for years, not quarters -- and the founder with a genuine position (the fit question of section 1.4) is usually inside a window that is more patient than the press makes it feel. The genuinely short windows are rarer than the founding folklore's urgency insists, and the ventures founded in panic against them are rarer still, in the record, than the ventures founded deliberately, a season late, by founders whose windows were real enough to wait for their audits.

### The comparison trap

The founding audits' last hazard arrives from outside the founder's own head: the comparison -- the other founders' timelines, the peer's raise, the acquaintance's exit, and the whole ambient scoreboard the era maintains on everyone's founding. The comparison is not a soft psychological problem; it is a decision problem, because the founders who found against the comparison make measurably different decisions: the raise sized to the peer's round rather than the plan's physics, the scaling triggered by the competitor's announcement rather than the venture's conditions, the exit timed to the cohort's window rather than the venture's arc -- decisions that have quietly substituted the scoreboard's logic (later than, bigger than, before) for the venture's logic (fits, funds, works). The comparison trap's cruelty is structural: the scoreboard samples the survivors (the raises announced, the exits celebrated -- the failures invisible), and the sample's bias makes every founder's timeline

look late and every venture look slow, because the founders comparing are comparing their full reality to the record's edited highlights.

The trap's discipline is the comparison's honest taxonomy, run whenever the ambient scoreboard starts making decisions: what is this feeling comparing -- my venture's evidence, or my venture's appearance next to theirs? The ventures compared on evidence (their cohort's economics against mine, their channel's cost against mine -- data, when it exists, and the founders who share real numbers under real confidence) teach; the ventures compared on appearance (the funding announcement, the press cycle, the headcount) mislead, systematically, in the direction of urgency. The discipline's instrument is the founding page itself: reread, dated, whenever the comparison starts to drive -- because the page states what this founding was actually for, with what position, at what conditions -- and the page's honest terms (the motive, the runway, the review date) are the only comparison the founder owes: this venture against its own founding decision, on the evidence, at the cadence. The rest of the scoreboard is the era's noise, and the founders who decide against it are the record's most consistent pattern: slower than the highlights, and still here.

## The founding's honest odds

The founding decision closes with the number the folklore refuses to state and the discipline owes the founder: the odds. Most new ventures do not become what their founders intended -- the venture-building record's base rates are sobering across every market and era, and the founder who has never heard the base rates has founded against the folklore's lottery, while the founder who has heard them can found against the real distribution. The honest odds change the founding in a specific direction, and the direction is this book's whole argument: the base rates are not improved by passion, risk tolerance, or the size of the leap; they are improved by the things that shift the venture's decision quality -- the founder's position (the base rates for founders building from genuine market standing are several times better than the derived-idea founders of Chapter 2), the evidence discipline (the ventures that reach revenue before scaling, that price honestly, that keep the runway honest -- the whole apparatus of the chapters that follow), and the founder's durability (the base rates for second and third foundings, by founders whose first ventures taught the lessons, are the record's strongest single improvement -- which is why the closing discipline of Chapter 9 matters more than any single venture's survival).

The odds' honest purpose is not discouragement but calibration: the founder who knows the base rates runs the decade differently -- the position spent more deliberately (the runway preserved for the learning curve the odds imply), the motive chosen more carefully (the decade-long pattern audited against the odds that the decade ends differently than planned), and the founding's meaning held with the maturity the odds demand: the venture as the decade's instrument, not the decade's only possible meaning. The founders who survive the record's odds are, disproportionately, the ones who never needed the single venture to be the single answer -- who built from position, ran the disciplines, kept the position recoverable, and treated the founding as the first decision of a career rather than the last bet of one. That is the founding decision's honest odds, and the discipline's whole offer: not the venture's survival -- no book can promise that -- but the founder's, and the founder's survival is the asset the base rates actually reward.

## The Closing Argument

The founding decision is the venture's first decision and its least examined: made under maximum uncertainty, on minimum evidence, by the most emotionally invested person in the room. The chapter's instruments are three audits and a page: the motive audit (the venture will be run by whichever motive the founder never named), the position audit (the first years are run on the founder's actual resources, not the plan), the fit question (not the founder type but the founder-venture-market-season fit), and the founding page itself -- the decision written, with its conditions and its review date. The leap is one founding shape and the bridge is another, and the bridge's gate keeps the decision honest longer. No audit can make the founding succeed, and none tries: the yield is calibration -- the founder who knows the motive, the position, and the fit builds a venture that matches them, and the one who does not builds a venture that will teach them, expensively, everything the page would have shown for free.

## Checklist for Chapter 1

- Write the motive audit's three columns honestly: the motives (no synonyms), the ten-year behavior patterns, and the conflicts. Which motive did you find hardest to name?
- Count the runway: months of full-time work your actual position supports, against the venture's realistic time-to-first-revenue. If the two numbers have never been put side by side, do it now.
- Have the obligation conversation before the founding: the family, the career capital, the identity interruption -- with the people who co-found by default.
- Answer the fit question in its three parts: the market standing, the work itself (not the idea of the work), and the season. Which part gave you the longest pause?
- If you are bridging, write the gate: the date, the number, or the evidence at which you decide fully or release the venture honestly.
- Write the founding page: what was decided, why, the conditions under which you would un-decide, and the review date. Keep it -- you will reread it.

# CHAPTER 2: THE IDEA AND THE EVIDENCE

## 2.1 Where ideas come from and where they don't

The founding decided, the venture needs its object, and the folklore's version of how the object arrives is the inspiration story: the shower, the napkin, the lightning bolt. The practiced version is duller and more useful: the durable venture ideas arrive from position, not from inspiration -- from the founder's standing somewhere the market's problems are visible, noticed over time, and understood from the inside. The patterns are consistent across the venture-building record: the operator who ran the broken process and finally asked why it could not be fixed; the professional who watched the same friction appear at every client and realized the friction was a market; the buyer who could not buy the thing and counted the others who could not either. The idea's origin matters because it predicts the idea's quality along the one dimension that matters: the evidence behind the noticing. The idea that arrived from inside the market carries its first evidence with it (the founder has seen the problem, its cost, and its victims), and the idea that arrived from outside the market -- from a trend, a technology, an article about where the money is going -- carries only its plausibility, and plausibility is the cheapest asset in the venture-building economy.

The era of abundant tools has multiplied exactly the wrong idea source: the trend-driven idea, generated by watching where capital and attention are flowing and deriving a venture to catch them. The derivation is not wrong as arithmetic; it is wrong as founding, because the derived idea has no founder behind it -- no standing, no noticing, no pattern of seeing the problem's texture -- and the market of derived ideas is crowded by every other deriver, all of whom read the same signals and arrived at the same place. The chapter's first discipline is stated as a question the founder asks of the idea itself: what did I see that the idea came from? The answer either locates the founder's position (the years inside the market, the pattern that repeated, the friction that would not leave) or it does not -- and the idea whose answer is "a trend" is an idea the founder will spend years learning what better-positioned founders knew at the start, in a market they entered years ahead.

## 2.2 The idea's worth: the three tests

An idea's worth is tested before it is built, and the tests are three, run in order, each cheap enough to kill the idea before the next test spends anything. The first is the problem test: is the idea attached to a problem that costs someone real money, real time, or real standing -- enough of any of the three that they would pay to make it stop? The problem test's discipline is quantification in the customer's own terms: the hours the friction costs, the revenue the gap loses, the risk the exposure carries; the problem that cannot be priced cannot be sold to, and the venture that solves an unpriceable problem has built a fascinating answer to a question nobody is asking. The second is the buyer test: the person with the problem is often not the person with the budget, and the venture lives or dies on whether the buyer's economics are attached to the problem's cost -- the employee who suffers the friction and the company that pays for its removal are two parties whose interests must be aligned for the venture to exist, and the misalignment (the sufferer has no budget, the budget-holder suffers nothing) is the classic idea that works as a product and fails as a business.

The third is the founder test, carried over from the fit question of Chapter 1: why this founder, for this idea -- the position, the craft, the decade the idea's market will demand? The three tests share a structure: each is a question the founder can answer before building anything, each has an honest answer that ends the idea, and the discipline is running them in the cheap order -- problem, buyer, founder -- before the venture's momentum makes any of the answers unwelcome. The ideas that survive the three tests are not guaranteed; they are merely tested, which is the best state an idea can be in before the evidence test of the next section, and the founder who runs the tests honestly will, over a founding career, kill their own ideas at a rate the folklore calls pessimism and the practitioners call the first form of success: not building the wrong thing for two years.

## 2.3 Evidence before build

The venture-building record's most consistent finding is also its most ignored: the ventures that build first and validate second spend their scarcest resource -- runway -- on the least informative artifact possible, the product itself, because the product answers only the question of whether it can be built, and building was never the risky part. The evidence discipline inverts the order: the cheapest artifact that produces a real signal comes before the more expensive one, every time. The pre-sell (the offer made before the product exists, priced, in writing, to a real buyer who can say no); the concierge (the service delivered by hand behind what will later be a product, testing whether the value arrives at all); the landing page (the promise stated publicly to see who stops); the pilot (the product's first version delivered to its first customers under terms that keep the learning honest) -- each artifact is a rung on a ladder of cost, and the discipline is to climb only when the rung below has carried weight: the evidence that the buyer will pay, the evidence that the value arrives, the evidence that the promise attracts, before the evidence that it can be built at scale.

The evidence discipline's enemy is not laziness but its opposite: the founder's craft, which wants to build, and the venture's momentum, which rewards the visible artifact. The build is the founder's comfort zone -- the work they can do alone, at night, with progress to show -- and the evidence work is the discomfort zone: the conversation with a buyer who might say no, the offer that might be refused, the price that might end the fantasy. The discipline's instrument is the evidence budget: the runway's allocation stated in advance, with the build's share released only when the evidence rungs have held -- the pre-sell's signatures, the concierge's retention, the pilot's payment -- and the founder who has written the budget has converted the discipline from a virtue (stay disciplined!) into a rule (nothing ships until the rung holds), which is the only form a discipline survives in a venture's pressure.

## 2.4 The customer conversation

The evidence discipline's core instrument is the customer conversation, and the conversation has a craft most founders never learn, because the folklore teaches the pitch when the purpose is the learn. The conversation's rules are few and strict. Talk to the people who live the problem, not the people who comment on it -- the operator, not the analyst; the sufferer, not the conference panel. Ask about the past and the present, never the future: what did you do last time this happened, what did it cost, what have you tried -- because the future question ("would you use...") invites the politeness that has killed more ventures than competitors have, and the past question invites the evidence that actually exists. Never pitch

in the learning conversation: the moment the founder sells, the conversation's purpose inverts, and the customer begins protecting the founder's feelings instead of reporting the market's facts. Write down the exact words: the customer's description of the problem, in the customer's language, is the venture's first marketing asset and its first product spec, and the summary that replaces the exact words has already lost the texture that made them valuable.

The conversation's discipline has a cadence: enough conversations that the pattern emerges -- the repetition, the anger, the specific phrase that appears in customer after customer -- because the pattern is the market speaking, and the founder who has heard the same problem described the same way twenty times holds something the derived ideas of section 2.1 can never have: the market's own words for its own pain. The cadence continues past the founding: the customer conversation is not a phase but a channel, kept alive through the venture's whole life, because the market's language drifts, the problem's texture changes, and the founder who stopped listening at the seed stage is running year four on year-zero evidence. The conversation is also the fit test's continuous form: the founder who dreads the conversations has learned something about the work fit that no audit could have shown -- and the founder who comes alive in them has learned the same.

## 2.5 The pivot and the kill

The evidence discipline's hardest output is not the confirmation but its absence: the evidence that the idea, as founded, is not going to work -- and the chapter's last instruments are the two the absence calls for. The kill is the evidence's honest verdict: the rungs that did not hold, the pre-sell that did not sell, the problem that evaporated when the founder looked at it in daylight. The kill's discipline is the founding page's un-decide condition, honored: the condition stated at the founding, met by the evidence, and acted on while the runway still exists for the next idea, because the kill that waits for the runway's end has converted a cheap lesson into an expensive one and a founder with a next venture into one without. The pivot is the evidence's subtler verdict: not the idea's death but its correction -- the buyer who was wrong (the product works, for someone else), the problem that was shallow (the real cost sits a step earlier in the process), the channel that was misjudged (they buy it, but not the way the venture sells it). The pivot's discipline is the same as the kill's, with one addition: the pivot is made on the evidence, stated in writing, as a new hypothesis with its own evidence budget -- because the pivot made on fatigue is the kill postponed, and the venture that pivots on vibes will pivot again, and again, until the runway does the killing the founder would not.

The kill and the pivot share the founder's real asset, which the chapter states as its close: the venture-building decade's durable advantage is not any single idea but the founder's honest relationship with evidence -- the capacity to run the cheap test, read the rung, and act on the reading without the identity crisis the folklore attaches to being wrong. The founder who can kill an idea cheaply and pivot one deliberately has converted failure from a catastrophe into an instrument, and the founder who cannot has staked their identity on every idea, which makes every test a referendum on the self, and referendums on the self are the one venue where evidence never wins.

### The landscape: what exists and why

## ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Aiman JoeHanz is a technology writer and analyst specializing in data center infrastructure, AI networking, and next-generation computing architectures. His work spans artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, energy systems, healthcare, and infrastructure design, treating each technology as engineering: parts, failure paths, and build programs.